This is an English adaptation of a FoodBud historical article originally published on December 30, 2021.
For foodservice operators, 2021 was a year of sharp contrasts: a wave of restaurant and supply-chain listings, heavy corrections in public-market valuations, and a rapid cooling of the financing market after an overheated start to the year.
The clearest operating lesson was a return to business fundamentals: store economics, supply-chain capability, format discipline, and realistic growth models.
Nayuki listed on June 30, 2021, at HK$19.80 per share. The stock fell below its issue price after listing, and its market value had fallen to about HK$15 billion by the time of the original article.
The listing also showed how China’s premium freshly made tea segment was settling. The earlier contest among Heytea, Nayuki and Lelecha had shifted: Lelecha had pulled back toward East China, while Nayuki was rethinking its store model.
Nayuki had once emphasized a “third place” concept and compared itself with Starbucks. After listing, however, it moved harder toward its smaller PRO store format. The article argues that the standard store model, with both tea and bakery operations, was not the fastest path to scalable growth. In China’s tea-drink market, most demand remains takeaway or delivery.
The PRO model also reduces location constraints linked to bakery exhaust systems, allowing Nayuki to enter offices and communities as well as malls. In East China, Nayuki was building central kitchen capacity to support bakery products in PRO stores. The strategic logic was to use tea traffic to drive afternoon-tea bakery sales, although product-market fit still needed work.
Helens listed in 2021 at HK$19.77 per share, similar to Nayuki’s listing price. Its market value at the time of the article was about HK$24.5 billion.
The listing helped fuel interest in small bars and late-night social formats. Helens’ positioning was to offer young consumers an affordable social space with atmosphere, avoiding the high prices and status dynamics often associated with nightlife consumption.
The article frames Helens’ differentiation as simple: accessible pricing, equal treatment of guests, and a place where groups can socialize without large spending differences.
Qianweiyangchu listed on the A-share market in September 2021. Its market value was about RMB1.9 billion at listing and had risen to about RMB5.2 billion by the time of the article.
The company became known as a listed frozen-food supply-chain player, including as a supplier of fried dough sticks to large chain brands. Yum China and Wallace were its two largest customers. Yum China contributed about 30% of revenue in 2018 and 2019, then about 23% in 2020.
The article highlights a basic supply-chain reality: suppliers benefit from being tied to strong anchor customers with stable order flow and exposure to customer growth.
Juewei also partially cashed out after Qianweiyangchu’s listing. It had invested RMB50 million and realized about RMB100 million in after-tax net profit from the listing-related exit.
Weizhixiang listed in April 2021 as a prepared-dish company, with an issue price of RMB28.53 per share. Its share price once rose to RMB125, taking market value to RMB12.5 billion. By the article date, market value had fallen back to about RMB9 billion.
For the previous three years, Weizhixiang reported revenue of RMB466 million, RMB542 million and RMB622 million, with net profit of RMB71.1249 million, RMB86.2433 million and RMB125 million.
The article argues that the public-market valuation was high relative to revenue scale, which encouraged other companies to reposition toward prepared dishes. It cites Guolian Aquatic Products as an example of a company shifting strategic emphasis toward prepared dishes after previously discussing crayfish.
The article expected more category-specific “first prepared-dish stocks” to emerge, including Xianmeilai, which had disclosed a prospectus using a seafood prepared-dish angle.
Noodle and rice-noodle concepts were heavily funded in 2021, including ramen brands, Hefu Noodle and Meet Noodles. Hefu Noodle’s valuation had reached RMB7 billion, while Meet Noodles had reached RMB3 billion.
Tam Jai International, a Hong Kong rice-noodle chain, broke issue price after listing and had a market value of only about HK$4.2 billion at the article date.
For fiscal 2021, ended March 30, 2021, Tam Jai International reported revenue of RMB1.47 billion. For the half year ended September 30, 2021, revenue was RMB970 million, higher than Hefu Noodle’s RMB840 million in the first half.
The market still valued Tam Jai lower because its Hong Kong store density offered less expansion imagination than large-scale mainland China growth. Tam Jai had begun opening stores in mainland China, but slowly. The article notes that competing with heavily financed mainland players would be difficult.
Even so, Tam Jai’s listing was encouraging for leading noodle-chain operators in mainland China.
Dutch Bros listed in 2021 at US$23 per share and had risen to US$52 by the article date. The article cited market value at US$8.5 billion, or about RMB54.1 billion, while also noting that some platforms had earlier calculated a lower figure of US$2.6 billion based on Class A shares before making corrections.
The article’s key point is that Dutch Bros positioned itself as a beverage company, not just a coffee chain. Its model turns coffee and energy drinks into customizable cup-based beverages.
Some analysts hoped Starbucks would learn from Dutch Bros by paying more attention to functional beverages and coffee-as-beverage formats.
Dutch Bros’ store sales model was mainly drive-thru. The article compares the underlying logic to small-store pickup models in China, while noting that market infrastructure differs. In the third quarter of 2021, Dutch Bros exceeded 500 stores and expected to open at least 112 new stores in 2022.
On Xiaohongshu, user commentary emphasized long lines, enthusiastic staff and influencer-store appeal.
Krispy Kreme opened its first store in 1937. JAB took the company private in 2016 and brought it back to public markets after five years. At the article date, Krispy Kreme’s market value was about US$2.96 billion, or about RMB18.8 billion.
The article identifies three parts of JAB’s approach.
First, acquisitions. In 2018, Krispy Kreme acquired 74.7% of Insomnia Cookies, a younger and more digital brand. Growth in the United States and Canada was driven partly by consolidating Insomnia.
Second, strategic transition away from traditional wholesale. Abandoning the traditional wholesale business reduced performance by US$22 million, but fresh bakery products and daily delivery helped offset the decline. The article contrasts long-shelf-life wholesale with a strategy focused on fresh, short-shelf-life products and digital capability.
Third, the hub-and-spoke network model. Krispy Kreme used larger stores plus factories as hubs to support small shops and daily-delivery points such as convenience-store shelves. It had 36 factories, including 13 company-operated factories.
Each hub could cover 37 to 45 spokes in the United States and Canada, and 65 to 71 spokes internationally. The key operating calculation was how many sales points and daily delivery centers each hub could support, and how profitable each hub-and-spoke system could be.
The article briefly compares this with China’s Taoli Bread, which has strong small-store and supermarket-shelf execution but, in the author’s view, could build a deeper moat if it moved further into store-side development.
First Watch is a daytime restaurant concept founded in 1983 and headquartered in Florida. It had 8,000 full-time employees and served customizable breakfast, brunch and lunch made with fresh ingredients.
Its menu included pancakes, omelets, sandwiches, salads, quinoa Power Bowls, avocado toast and Chickichanga. Its market value at the article date was about US$940 million, or about RMB6 billion. The article compares that with Babi, a Chinese breakfast bun company, whose market value was RMB8.6 billion, while noting the models differ.
First Watch viewed its operating system as a competitive advantage. Although it opened only 8.5 hours per day, before the COVID-19 pandemic its average unit volume was US$1.6 million.
The company argued in its IPO prospectus that its “no night shifts ever” model helped recruit staff and managers, supporting employee satisfaction, retention, customer demand and operating results.
Portillo’s listed on Nasdaq on October 21, 2021, under ticker PTLO. It raised US$405 million by issuing 20.3 million shares at US$20 per share. At the article date, its market value was about US$2.6 billion, or about RMB16.6 billion, with 67 stores.
The article highlights several operating features.
Portillo’s runs against the SKU-simplification trend by offering broader menu variety. Its restaurants use different themes and designs. It operates a large-store model, with store sizes compared to Haidilao in China, which slows expansion. It had therefore begun testing smaller stores at about half the size of large stores.
The article also notes that Portillo’s had not closed a store over many years, linked to its rent and lease strategy. Rent cost was about 5%. Once it secured a restaurant property, it would still need to pay rent even if the restaurant closed, so the incentive was to keep operating.
Portillo’s believed it could grow store count by 10% annually over the next 25 years, from 67 stores to more than 600.
Sweetgreen listed on the New York Stock Exchange on November 19, 2021. Its issue price was US$28. On the first trading day it opened at US$52, briefly rose to US$56.20, exceeded US$6 billion in market value, then closed at US$49.50, up 76.79%. At the article date, its market value was about US$3.3 billion, or about RMB21 billion.
Sweetgreen defines itself as fast-casual, distinct from traditional fast food. Its proposition is healthy food with short preparation time.
The article argues that Sweetgreen’s strongest ability is to create premium value through stores, storytelling and philosophy. It promotes not only healthy eating but also a different understanding of food.
One distinctive practice is seasonal menu adjustment. Store signage marks spring, summer, autumn and winter, with the current season lit up.
A chalkboard near the entrance lists ingredient origins, such as red onion from Dagele Farm in New York, organic basil from Goodness Farm in New York, honey from Catskill Food Supply in New York, organic baby spinach from Fresh Fields in California, blue cheese from Great Hill Blue in Massachusetts, chicken from Allen Farms in Delaware, and Colombian rainbow trout from Pacific Seafood in Washington. The article says 16 ingredient sources were listed. Customers could choose chef-designed dishes or mix from more than 30 ingredients.
Sweetgreen also clearly defines sourcing distance: ingredients within 50 kilometers are “super-local,” while those within 400 kilometers are “local.”
Each store has a unique design while maintaining a consistent natural theme: wood, green-yellow-white colors, simple lines and plants. The article notes its appeal among younger consumers.
The article also mentions Oatly and Jiahe Foods as companies worth studying, but does not analyze them in detail.
It then raises several market questions for 2022.
Capital markets for foodservice would likely return to rationality after excessive valuations and overheating.
Tea-drink investment and M&A would continue, with supply-chain strengthening remaining a long-term task for leading brands. The premium freshly made tea market was seen as largely defined by Heytea and Nayuki, with the key question being how far they could continue growing.
In mid-priced tea, the article saw Guming as a potentially strong player because of its steady growth path and solid supply chain. Shuyi Tealicious, backed by Juewei, was worth watching for possible gains from Juewei’s supply-chain resources. For Modern China Tea Shop, the article argued that advanced brand-building awareness was not matched by internal management strength, making strategy and organizational capability key issues.
In value tea, Mixue Bingcheng had passed 20,000 stores and needed to find a second growth curve. One expected question for 2022 was which tea brand would list next.
If Yaomazi successfully listed in 2022, the article suggested watching how public markets valued it. If conditions were favorable, more Sichuan-style seasoning and compound-condiment companies might follow. Sichuan Dingdian had previously had its listing application rejected by the CSRC.
The article expected Tims China to list in the first half of 2022. In coffee, Starbucks would likely continue facing pressure from Luckin Coffee, Manner and Tims as they kept opening stores. It also asked when Luckin might return from the pink-sheet market.
The article asked whether supply-chain companies such as Asian Seafood Harbor would see another listing wave. Cash-burning players such as Meicai, if unable to raise more primary-market capital, would either keep shrinking or list under pressure.
Chinese bakery entrepreneurs needed to think harder about real repeat purchase behavior, whose business they were displacing, and what new value they were creating. If the model was merely casual retail, the path would be difficult.
Chinese fast-food brands were approaching listings, and the article asked who would complete one first in 2022. It also asked whether pizza chains, second-tier hotpot brands and more dine-in-oriented restaurant companies would follow the listing wave.
Hop Hing Group, operator of Yoshinoya and DQ, was expected to complete privatization and delisting in 2022. With earlier international brands in China such as Ajisen Ramen showing weak share prices, the article asked whether more would privatize and delist.
Finally, after the failure of brands such as Element Fresh, founded by international operators but unable to keep up with market changes, the article asked whether 2022 would bring another round of eliminations.
Note: IPO, valuation, market-capitalization, store-opening and forward-looking figures above are historical, from the original article published on December 30, 2021.