This is an English adaptation of a FoodBud historical article originally published on May 24, 2022.
FoodBud spoke with Gao Yuan, one of the shareholders of Bingz Canada, around the first anniversary of Bingz's first Canadian store. The discussion focused on operating models and practical lessons for Chinese foodservice brands expanding overseas.
According to Baifu Holdings' 2021 annual report, Bingz generated RMB 196 million in revenue in 2021, up 48% year on year, and turned profitable with full-year net profit of RMB 5.395 million.
Bingz opened its first Canadian store in May 2021 after two years of preparation. FoodBud described it as the first Chinese fast-food chain to operate directly in the North American market. At the time, Toronto had two places with long lines: vaccination sites and Bingz. Founder Meng Bing said Bingz had strong category advantages internationally and could potentially reach 5,000 to 10,000 stores.
Market Watch estimated that the first Toronto store generated CAD 400,000 in revenue in its first month, or about RMB 2.2 million. FoodBud compared this with Shake Shack's reported average monthly sales of USD 300,000, about RMB 2 million, for company-operated stores in fiscal 2021.
A key part of Bingz's overseas performance was localization. Rather than emphasizing authenticity, the brand focused on customer demand. Its two-product-line setup worked in North America: in addition to roujiamo and liangpi, fried chicken and chili-oil fries also became popular items.
FoodBud said Bingz planned to accelerate overseas expansion in 2022. The brand had been invited to enter Yorkdale, Canada's leading shopping center, becoming its first Chinese brand tenant.
Gao said North America should not be treated as one English-speaking mass market. Operators need to segment by ethnicity and community: Indian, Korean, South Asian, Chinese, Mexican and others, with different priorities by location and taste profile. He noted that ethnic communities often cluster geographically, so site selection and menu ordering should reflect that.
For Chinese chains, starting with Chinese customers can be a tactical choice, but Gao said it may also reveal that the product or team lacks the capability to reach new audiences. He pointed to bubble tea as a category that has already educated mainstream North American customers. Chatime, for example, has stores in areas with few Chinese residents but draws customers from many ethnic groups.
Product fit matters. Gao said some products, such as suancai fish, may have limited appeal to Western consumers, while Bingz's roujiamo can travel better. In areas with more Indian customers, for example, pork can be de-emphasized while vegetarian, chicken and beef items are highlighted.
Gao said brands do not necessarily need to start in New York. Toronto can be a strong first stop because it is large, with more than 6 million people, continued net population inflow, a high immigrant share, and a sizable Chinese community. Vancouver has slightly fewer Chinese residents than Toronto but higher density, which can help with hiring, management and early customers.
By contrast, a first New York store may be difficult to place in Manhattan and could end up in Flushing or another Chinese-heavy district. Gao's suggested path was to establish Toronto deeply, build the team, then expand west to Vancouver and south into the United States.
Gao described two basic models.
Model A is direct commitment by the brand owner. The headquarters invests heavily, sends people to the local market, controls operations, and brings in small local shareholders for support. The brand retains control, including veto rights. Gao said Bingz Canada follows this approach, with the brand owner keeping overseas initiative while committing both people and capital.
Model B makes the brand owner a behind-the-scenes partner. Gao recommended a joint venture rather than simple licensing, because shared economics create stronger alignment. In his view, selling master or sub-agency rights and collecting franchise fees often fails to create a long-term operating loop.
FoodBud noted that many hotpot brands have entered North America, including Dalongyi, Xiaolongkan and Haidilao. Gao said performance depends largely on the local operating team because the product formats are not dramatically different. He cited Liuyishou Hotpot as a brand whose domestic momentum may have weakened, but whose North American operations were strong because of an effective local team.
Gao said strong overseas teams are built on shared upside. The people doing the work need to receive a larger share of the returns. Brand owners must first decide what they want overseas operations to become. If they invest little capital or support and push most of the risk onto the overseas team, the outcome is unlikely to be strong.
Gao said the biggest problems are structural. Many Chinese restaurant brands sell agency rights, collect fees, and treat overseas growth as a low-risk revenue stream. In his view, very few brands are deeply operating overseas themselves. Based on his understanding, Bingz and Haidilao were the main examples at that time. Haidilao had built coordination across North America, Southeast Asia and Europe, with Singapore serving as a talent development center for store managers.
He said most brands prefer to avoid overseas risk, so they sell brand-use rights and require franchisees to buy core ingredients from headquarters. This can create tension over time. If headquarters marks up ingredients too much, local teams may look for local substitutes. If the overseas market performs well and headquarters sharply raises franchise fees, the local team may stop cooperating because the two sides did not grow together.
Gao said Chinese burger or fried-chicken brands are not necessarily blocked from international markets. He cited Jollibee from the Philippines, saying that in Canada it had ranked first for two or three consecutive years by popularity, and if not first in sales, then at least in the top tier.
For a tea brand testing North America, Gao said the simplest route is brand authorization with a deposit, followed by shipping ingredients. Ingredient shelf life should be long because sea freight was taking about three to four months, so at least one year of shelf life was needed.
He estimated that opening a first store would require about USD 1 million. The store itself may not strictly need that much, but the first overseas location is usually built as a flagship. He suggested at least 1,200 square feet, careful decoration, and a site near Chinese international students to create a baseline Chinese customer base while still reaching other Asian and ethnic groups. Decoration, equipment, ingredients, transfer fees and the local team would together require at least USD 1 million.
Gao said a brand should expect roughly one year from preparation to opening in North America. The process includes negotiations, registration, site selection, renovation, initial product testing and shipping time. A fast case might take six months.
FoodBud noted that a friend in Vietnam had said founders should not expect to manage overseas expansion remotely from China; they need to spend years on the ground. Gao agreed this was a broad trend, while adding that each brand and founder needs to be assessed case by case.
Note: Store-count potential, 2022 expansion plans, shipping timelines and first-store cost estimates are historical figures and guidance from the 2022 source article.