This is an English adaptation of a FoodBud historical article originally published on June 19, 2022.
According to Wu Duidui (ID: esnql520), Genki Forest's overseas expansion became a renewed topic after news spread that Liu Zhen had left the company.
Genki Forest began internationalizing in 2019. In early 2021, its international business unit became independent. In April 2021, the company completed a US$500 million strategic financing round and said the funds would be used for overseas expansion.
Less than a year after its flagship sparkling water launched on Amazon in the United States, U.S. general manager Bliss Dake and international business head Liu Zhen both departed. The sparkling water, which had once entered Amazon's top 10 ranking for the category, also saw sales decline.
Executive changes in overseas regions arrived alongside internal turbulence at Genki Forest and intensified competition from Coca-Cola and PepsiCo in China. Although Genki Forest built its own factories and carved out a domestic supply-chain path, its overseas business remained difficult to control amid pandemic uncertainty, ocean freight, and logistics constraints.
The pressure came from two sides.
First, overseas expansion costs remained high. Building overseas factories, forming local teams, and managing ocean freight all consumed significant capital and resources.
Second, the company had to learn local markets almost from zero: marketing in new markets, offline distribution penetration, consumer acceptance, and even the details of product labeling on the bottle.
By the time of the article, Genki Forest had entered more than 40 countries and regions, including the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Australia, and Singapore. Its main export products were sparkling water, Rancha tea, and milk tea.
But overseas growth was not easy. Based on overseas pricing at the time, Genki Forest was slightly more expensive than the sparkling-water market shaped by Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. In overseas sparkling-water markets, negotiations for offline channel access and ingredient quality checks were both difficult hurdles.
The first visible shift in Genki Forest's U.S. business came through executive turnover. While media attention focused on Liu Zhen, the person directly responsible for the U.S. business was often overlooked.
Bliss Dake, later market VP at Oregon-based True Terpenes, was responsible for Genki Forest's U.S. launch and operations from February 2021 to January 2022. He had previously led marketing at tea brands including Golden Leaf and Mighty Leaf, and worked for soft-drink and beer brands such as Rogue, giving him familiarity with the U.S. soda and sparkling-water markets.
Dake left Genki Forest after only one year, unusual compared with his prior tenures. Public information showed he spent 11 years and 4 months at Mighty Leaf and 2 years and 7 months at Golden Leaf.
Several Chinese media outlets reported Liu Zhen's departure in late March 2022. According to a source cited by Caijing Tianxia Weekly, her actual departure was earlier, at the end of 2021, and she had only kept Feishu access to avoid attracting attention.
If Liu Zhen did leave at the end of 2021, Dake's January 2022 departure would be easier to understand. A change in international-business leadership was not a positive signal externally and created pressure internally.
At an April 15 media briefing, vice president Li Guoxun said a new executive who had “achieved financial freedom” and completed an internet startup would take over the international business.
The article argues that Liu Zhen's results were not poor, though they may have missed internal expectations. During her tenure, Genki Forest obtained Singapore's HCS health mark and Australia's Health Star Rating, entered mainstream channels in Europe and the United States, and made deeper inroads into Asian supermarkets. It also entered Walmart's online channel in the United States.
Internal expectations, however, went further.
According to LatePost, Genki Forest set a 2022 internal revenue target of RMB 10 billion, implying year-on-year growth of 37%. That was much slower than its previously reported growth: 260% year-on-year revenue growth in 2021 and 309% in 2020.
Over the prior five years, the brand had moved from rapid rise to slowing growth. The change could also be seen in founder Tang Binsen's public profile. In 2020 and 2021, he was still speaking about a pirate spirit and pushing forward aggressively; by the time of the article, he had gradually faded from public view.
Li Guoxun became the person appearing publicly on behalf of Genki Forest. His tone was more modest and cautious, reflecting the performance pressure facing the company.
High expectations from capital markets increased that pressure. One view cited in the article was that Tang came from the internet sector and was used to fast, aggressive expansion overseas, but fast-moving consumer goods differ fundamentally from internet gaming. For beverages, targets that nearly double every year are difficult.
Under pressure, turbulence followed. There were market rumors that Genki Forest was quietly slimming down, affecting both ordinary employees and executives. Multiple media outlets reported organizational adjustments, including department mergers and closures. Vice president Zong Hao, responsible for brand operations, and vice president Ran Hao, responsible for human resources, had also left.
Despite these internal and external pressures, overseas business had once given Genki Forest reason for optimism. At the end of 2021, its sparkling water entered the top 10 of Amazon's U.S. sparkling-water ranking for the first time, becoming the only Chinese brand on the list.
That was not pure luck. The U.S. beverage market was already highly competitive.
Coca-Cola and PepsiCo held large positions, but they did not own the entire market. In non-alcoholic beverages, Keurig Dr Pepper and Monster Beverage Corporation were also major first-tier players with multiple soft-drink lines.
Competition was still fierce within sparkling water. Wisconsin-based LaCroix had already become dominant locally. Premium names such as Perrier, San Pellegrino, and VOSS were also present, but no single brand owned the category. Consumers had many choices and were highly loyal to brands they already consumed.
U.S. car ownership and household size also shaped the channel mix. Sparkling water was often bought offline by the case, and consumers did not see the weight as a major barrier. Case buying raised switching costs: consumers hesitated before buying a large quantity of an unfamiliar product in case they disliked it.
Offline supermarkets were also selective, with higher entry barriers. Premium and health-positioned retailers such as PCC and Whole Foods Market might prefer local brands or completely zero-calorie, sugar-free drinks. As a foreign brand, Genki Forest faced greater difficulty getting in.
In leading Asian supermarket H Mart, Genki Forest could be found on shelves, but its placement was not advantageous. Its unit price of around US$3 was often surrounded by US$1 items, making trial less attractive. Against promotional offers at mainstream grocers such as Safeway and QFC, including buy-two-get-one or buy-two-get-three deals, Genki Forest's single-unit price looked less compelling.
Although the U.S. team pushed hard into offline channels, Genki Forest's China marketing experience was not enough to unlock the mainstream local market. Chinese consumers remained the core buyers; the product could even be found in some Chinese restaurants.
According to the brand's U.S. website at the time, offline availability was concentrated mainly on the West Coast, including California and Washington, as well as Texas and parts of the East Coast. The central and northern United States had not yet been reached at scale.
The official channel information showed availability through offline retailers including 99 Ranch Market, Berkeley Bowl Marketplace, H Mart, and Woolworths. But 99 Ranch Market, the largest channel by share, was essentially still a Chinese supermarket.
Online, Genki Forest had entered Walmart, though flavor availability was incomplete. Amazon appeared to offer the fullest online range. On Asian e-commerce platforms such as Yamibuy and Weee!, consumer reviews were relatively positive.
On Genki Forest's U.S. Amazon page, two topics drew the most discussion: the brand's origin and identity, and the product's ingredients and additives. These were key concerns for demanding U.S. consumers.
Some consumers directly asked whether it was a Chinese brand or a Japanese brand. The packaging looked Japanese, while the product description said it was made in China, creating confusion.
For U.S. consumers, consistency between brand identity and product presentation matters. If the product is a Chinese sparkling water, it may need to express more Chinese elements, though not necessarily familiar symbols such as pandas, bamboo, or dragons. The large Japanese-style character the Japanese-style “ki” character on the bottle led some consumers to question the brand instinctively.
The article cites a 2016 paper by Wei Ye from the School of Liberal Arts at Liaoning University, published in Modern Chinese, comparing the meanings and cultural connotations of Chinese the Chinese “qi” character and Japanese the Japanese-style “ki” character. From the perspective of character evolution and meaning, choosing the Japanese-style “ki” character and enlarging it on the most visible part of the bottle made misidentification as a Japanese brand understandable.
After Genki Forest became popular, the public may have forgotten that the brand was once caught in controversy over “pseudo-Japanese” design. A later tea gift box was also questioned for resembling Japanese tea brand LUPICIA.
The article argues that shortcuts taken in brand design had to be repaid later. In a strict and selective U.S. market, benefits previously absorbed by the brand were being given back.
Beyond brand origin, U.S. consumers also questioned ingredients. If the sparkling water claimed zero calories on the bottle, why did it contain 12 grams of carbohydrates? By comparison, PepsiCo's Bubly could claim zero sugar, zero fat, and zero calories.
Consumers were also sensitive to sweeteners. Many flavored beverages in North America use natural flavors, while the U.S. version of Genki Forest listed “artificial flavors” on the label. That pushed some health-oriented consumers away.
From a longer supply-chain perspective, overseas costs remained high. Compared with consumer electronics or fashion retail, beverages have lower unit value but higher weight, and they are more easily damaged in transit. Amazon reviews also showed consumer complaints about dented can bottoms.
The brand did make localization adjustments. For example, earlier bottled sparkling water had a shelf life of only 270 days. After overseas sparkling water switched to aluminum cans, shelf life could extend to 540 days, creating more flexibility for global logistics.
The article ends with a more optimistic consumer signal: perhaps many overseas consumers had simply not tried the product yet. In one Amazon review, a female consumer said that after her husband happened to drink it at a poke shop, he searched nearby supermarkets to find where it was sold.
Note: financing figures, executive information, channel status, rankings, and 2022 targets are historical references from the original June 19, 2022 article.