This is an English adaptation of a FoodBud historical article originally published on October 14, 2022.
Wu Duidui reported that a new wave of Chinese coffee brands had begun moving into overseas markets, especially the United States, after China’s domestic coffee sector gained confidence from rapid store growth, product innovation, and rising consumer interest.
Before Shanghai became the city with the most coffee shops in the world, few observers saw the center of the third-wave coffee movement shifting from Europe and the United States toward Asia. In China, drinks such as Dirty coffee became symbols of how an imported category could be localized and recombined.
That domestic momentum gave Chinese coffee companies room to experiment. In Shanghai’s plane-tree-lined districts, cafes appeared almost every 100 meters. Manner opened 200 stores across lower-tier cities in one push. Luckin gained the confidence to publicly challenge Starbucks after overtaking it in store count. Tea chains including Heytea and Nayuki also entered freshly made coffee.
For brands less dependent on physical stores, the overseas path looked lighter. In instant coffee, players such as Saturnbird, Yongpu and Timsum Coffee began carrying freeze-dried powder and coffee concentrate beyond China.
Consumers familiar with Asian American e-commerce platforms such as Weee! and Yamibuy were seeing Chinese coffee newcomers arrive in the U.S. market.
The main brands were instant coffee players already known in China, including Saturnbird, Yongpu and Timsum Coffee. Other less widely known brands, such as Fujian-based Blackmori Coffee, also appeared in online channels.
The U.S. already had many instant coffee brands. The more immediate change was not market share, but the way these Chinese products introduced new drinking methods. On Facebook, YouTube and other platforms, creators noted that ultra-instant coffee brands printed preparation suggestions on their packaging. Saturnbird even indicated which roast types were better suited to ice water, hot water or milk.
By the time of the article, Saturnbird, Timsum Coffee and Yongpu had entered Yamibuy and were being discussed on DealNews-style North American shopping communities. Timsum Coffee and Saturnbird were also available on Weee!. Blackmori Coffee and Saturnbird had entered Amazon.
Saturnbird moved fastest in overseas setup. It had its own independent site and also built a Shopify storefront. The brand appeared to steer users toward its private-domain site: new users on the independent site could receive a 15% discount and free U.S. delivery on any purchase, while the Shopify registration discount was 10% with free shipping on orders above $30. Accepted payment methods included Visa, Mastercard, American Express, Discover and PayPal.
For logistics, Saturnbird’s independent site used standard FedEx or UPS delivery, generally taking 3 to 8 business days. On Weee!, delivery could be as fast as two business days. Yongpu and Timsum Coffee did not yet have independent sites, so their shipping depended on third-party platforms. Under Yamibuy’s rules, products generally arrived 3 to 5 days after ordering. Weee!’s official delivery was within 2 days, while Pantry delivery, such as Timsum Coffee’s supplier on Weee!, could take around 5 days.
At that stage, none of Yongpu, Saturnbird, Timsum Coffee or Blackmori Coffee had been found in offline North American supermarket channels. For an early overseas push, that pace was understandable. Saturnbird had also emphasized online channels in China before opening offline stores in Changsha and Shanghai. Yongpu began offline, later entered Hema and then developed a small number of offline channels.
The first challenge was the U.S. coffee market itself. Although the United States played an important role in the third wave of specialty coffee, coffee culture there was still largely driven by functional demand.
That meant the domestic halo of these Chinese brands would not automatically translate. Consumption based on novelty, check-ins or curiosity could fall sharply, making cold starts difficult.
Functional demand also pushes consumers toward black coffee for alertness. Black coffee is embedded from breakfast onward: donuts, scones, muffins and macarons are commonly paired with acidic, bitter black coffee. In convenience stores, subway stations, gas stations, grocery stores and office buildings, black coffee is one of the most common beverages, much like black tea.
According to Urban Bean Coffee’s 2021 statistics cited in the article, 64% of Americans drank coffee every day, and 35% of coffee users usually chose black coffee.
That differs sharply from Chinese consumers’ stronger preference for milk coffee, fruit-flavored coffee and mixed coffee drinks. U.S. consumers may see soda-water coffee as inventive, but acceptance may not match coffee consumers in Shanghai, Beijing or Shenzhen. In Chinese first-tier cities, creative drinks such as iced orange Americano, grapefruit Americano, peach Americano, passionfruit soda coffee lemonade and sea-salt cider coffee had become common.
In the United States, the third-wave coffee movement more often focused on beans themselves: origin, roast level and taste differences, rather than mix-ins. That helped independent cafes and local coffee brands build stories around beans, such as Blue Bottle’s roaster-founder narrative or New York’s Wandering Bear.
Convenience was another issue. Wandering Bear became known in New York partly by launching a valve-style ready-to-drink format. For consumers seeking immediate coffee, even fast-dissolving powder still takes around 3 seconds.
Among Chinese brands already overseas, Timsum Coffee offered coffee concentrate, while Saturnbird and Yongpu focused mainly on freeze-dried powder. Powder still needed brewing, and concentrate still needed dilution. In convenience, both lagged ready-to-drink systems.
The counterpoint was packaging. Yongpu, Saturnbird and Timsum Coffee all used small individual sachets or cups, making them suitable for travel. If consumers were already loyal to their flavors, stickiness could be strong.
But in the broader instant coffee market, even when consumers upgrade their quality expectations, incumbents can respond with improved products. A consumer loyal to Brand A may buy Brand A’s higher-end instant powder rather than switch to Brand B. That is real brand loyalty: the likelihood that consumers stay with a brand despite multiple alternatives.
Freeze-drying technology, nitrogen freshness-locking technology and recycling programs were not yet enough to create a decisive differentiation from foreign coffee brands. That made it difficult for Chinese instant coffee brands to establish a strong overseas memory point.
The U.S. coffee market was already highly competitive.
For powder-like formats similar to Yongpu and Saturnbird, the closest established equivalent was capsule coffee, which had been popular for years. Capsule coffee grinds beans into powder and seals the powder in aluminum capsules to reduce air exposure and oxidation. Peet’s, Starbucks and illy were common capsule brands on U.S. supermarket coffee shelves.
A key retention mechanism was machine compatibility. Once a consumer bought a coffee machine, capsule size often determined the brand options they could continue buying. This was especially clear in Europe.
The U.S. market was somewhat more open because Green Mountain’s K-Cup system created an open capsule platform. Brands such as Peet’s and Starbucks produced capsules compatible with K-Cup and marked that on packaging. Through this system, Keurig and K-Cup quickly occupied market share.
Capsules were only the entry-level stage for many U.S. coffee consumers. Those with higher quality requirements and less need for extreme convenience often chose home coffee machines from brands such as Breville, De’Longhi and Nestle.
According to reports cited in the article, 79% of U.S. coffee users made coffee themselves. Global Industry Analysts Inc. reported that although the global smart coffee machine market was only $167.5 million during the pandemic, the United States accounted for 43%, or nearly half of global share, at $72.2 million.
From that perspective, capsule coffee had already taken part of the instant coffee market, while home coffee machines deepened consumers’ interest in whole beans. Both trends diverted attention away from the market that Yongpu and Saturnbird needed to reach.
Even among consumers focused on instant coffee, Chinese brands were not the only option. Japanese and Korean instant coffee brands were also strong.
As the third coffee wave swept Asia, China was not the only beneficiary. Japan and South Korea, both large coffee-consuming markets, had built advantages in bean roasting and coffee production. Japan’s UCC, with decades of history, had popular coffee powder in the U.S. market. Korean coffee giant Maxim had also captured part of the instant market and recently launched premium coffee brand KANU, which had entered U.S. e-commerce retail channels.
Other Asian countries also had representative coffee brands in the U.S. Malaysia’s Old Town and Aik Cheong brought white coffee to American consumers. Vietnamese coffee brands included G7, while newer players such as Copper Cow Coffee were emerging.
For Saturnbird, Yongpu, Timsum Coffee and similar Chinese brands, overseas expansion at that moment was both well timed and difficult. China’s booming coffee market had given these players confidence and exported more innovative Chinese coffee formats abroad. How long that confidence could support them in unfamiliar markets remained uncertain.