This is an English adaptation of a FoodBud historical article originally published on November 9, 2022.
Xia Guang She reported on the overseas expansion of Chinese hotpot brands, noting that hotpot has become one of the most visible Chinese foodservice formats abroad because it is more standardized than many chef-dependent Chinese dining formats.
After COVID-19 disruptions, overseas demand appeared to be recovering in 2022. Chengdu-based Xiaolongkan had recently opened four overseas stores in Tokyo Ueno, Duesseldorf, New York, and Sihanoukville, bringing its overseas store count to 40. Coucou, the premium brand under Xiabuxiabu, opened its first overseas store in Singapore earlier in 2022, with nearly 100 tables waiting at peak times during trial operations.
Hotpot base exports were also rising. According to Chongqing Customs, in Q1 2022 it supervised exports of 138 tons of hotpot base worth more than RMB 3.508 million, up 61.97% in volume and 90.96% in value year on year.
Chinese restaurants have expanded abroad in several waves: early immigrant-run restaurants, state-owned legacy brands such as Donglaishun and Quanjude after China’s reform and opening, and chain brands such as Little Sheep in the early 2000s.
For international operators, the core operational point is standardization. Industry observer Momo told Xia Guang She that traditional Chinese full-service restaurants face overseas constraints around ingredient sourcing, complex cooking processes, inconsistent execution across outlets, dependence on skilled chefs, and varied local tastes.
Hotpot has structural advantages:
Taste matters, but it is not the only variable. Pricing, management, supply chain, service model, and local compliance all shape outcomes.
Donglaishun, the old Beijing mutton hotpot brand, had strong recognition among foreign visitors to China, including former U.S. President Richard Nixon and former Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. But its early overseas efforts after reform and opening stalled because of limited local-market understanding, outdated management practices, and investment barriers.
Little Sheep took a more adaptive route. Its first overseas store opened in Los Angeles in 2003. The brand simplified menu items, removed animal offal that many foreign diners resisted, created a simple hotpot guide, and used picture-heavy bilingual menus. It also offered individual pots alongside shared pots to fit separate-dining habits, and developed mushroom vegetarian soup bases and low-salt soup bases for vegetarian diners and customers with hypertension or diabetes.
Chinese student Li Ran told Xia Guang She that although Little Sheep had become hard to find in China, it was surprisingly popular abroad, with foreign customers eating hotpot with chopsticks and queues extending downstairs from a second-floor restaurant.
Xiang Tian Xia, a Sichuan-Chongqing hotpot brand that began international expansion in 2015, chose a more authentic positioning. It kept Sichuan-style heavy numbing spice and heat, and retained ingredients such as beef tripe, duck intestine, and duck gizzard. Its overseas interiors also leaned strongly Chinese. For its Flushing, New York store, the brand reportedly bought an old Qiang ethnic house from Beichuan Qiang Autonomous County in Mianyang, Sichuan, dismantled its decorative elements, shipped them to the U.S., and reassembled them in the restaurant.
Xiang Tian Xia’s overseas site strategy was described as “one city, one landmark; one place, one scene.” Stores were often located near urban landmarks, including Clarke Quay in Singapore, New World Mall in Flushing, and Sydney’s Chinatown. Founder Zhu Quan previously said the customer mix had shifted from 90% Chinese and 10% foreign consumers at the beginning to about 30% foreign consumers.
Overseas hotpot is often expensive because of higher labor, management, and logistics costs. Chinese student Sun Yang said a comparable meal could cost more than twice as much as in China. A U.S. office worker, Wendy, said she and three friends spent more than USD 300 on a hotpot dinner.
Xiaolongkan in Thailand also left many consumers with the impression of being expensive. On a local Chiang Mai food platform, its dishes were described as a high-end hotpot option from China.
Little Sheep’s relatively accessible pricing was supported by earlier supply-chain investment. In 2006, it moved upstream into food and raw-material production, building its own lamb and soup-base processing facilities and investing in cold-chain logistics. In 2011, it invested in its own seasoning factory. Before Yum China acquired Little Sheep in 2011, the brand’s 2010 financial report showed lamb products and condiments generated RMB 420 million in revenue, equal to 21.7% of group revenue.
After the acquisition, Little Sheep missed some domestic growth opportunities, but its mature supply chain gave it another overseas route: packaged hotpot products. Its hotpot ingredients and retail products had been present for around a decade on mainstream U.S. supermarket and e-commerce shelves, and some overseas social media users recommended buying Little Sheep soup base to make hotpot at home.
Haidilao was the fastest-opening brand among Chinese hotpot chains going abroad. As of December 31, 2021, Haidilao had 114 restaurants across Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and overseas markets.
Its overseas business, Super Hi, showed revenue growth over the prior three years, but losses widened from USD 33 million to USD 54 million and then USD 150 million. In its prospectus, Super Hi attributed the losses to the combined effects of COVID-19 and a high proportion of newly opened restaurants.
The article also highlighted localization problems. Haidilao’s first U.S. store, in Arcadia near Los Angeles, received negative media coverage soon after opening because it lacked an English menu and English phone reservations. Some of Haidilao’s signature service elements also did not translate cleanly. An often-cited example involved servers overhearing a birthday mention and bringing cake; the customers interpreted this as an invasion of privacy. Free manicures, a signature service in China, also raised questions in the U.S. because diners did not understand why nail services belonged inside a restaurant.
Founder Zhang Yong told Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao that he was overseas to learn. He said high prices reflected inadequate market research, and strong single-store performance in Singapore had made Haidilao overconfident about overseas pricing. He also said the lack of an English menu in the U.S. meant the company had not properly implemented its customer-first values.
Hotpot’s overseas growth also extends to soup bases, cookware, and social dining rituals.
Industry observer Xin Xin told Xia Guang She that exporting hotpot base is complex because ingredients, processing, inspection, packaging, and shipping must comply with local policies and standards. Butter-based Sichuan-Chongqing soup bases are especially complicated because animal fat requires quarantine procedures; a problem in one step can block the whole batch from export.
Chongqing Customs had intervened in export processes, supported standards and certification systems for hotpot-base companies, and monitored 98 risk indicators including additives, heavy metals, and colony counts.
The article also noted that overseas media and social platforms were helping turn hotpot into a social experience. A Forbes article described hosting a hotpot party at home and introduced tools such as induction cookers, divided pots, hotpot ladles, and dipping-sauce dishes. In Malaysia, Chinese mala hotpot had inspired halal adaptations, including Mala Mini Hotpot, which combined mala flavor with halal ingredients and processes for Muslim diners.
For Haidilao, cultural-service elements such as face-changing performances and noodle-pulling became content for overseas diners and social platforms including TikTok and YouTube. U.S. consumer Judith told the author that she and friends ordered the “noodle dance” out of curiosity, and that it became the most memorable part of the meal.
The article’s central point is that hotpot is one of the more exportable Chinese foodservice formats, but not all brands succeed for the same reason. Some adapt menus and service formats; others lean into authenticity and landmark-driven brand experience. Supply chain capability can support both restaurant operations and retail products. But overseas markets also require precise work on pricing, compliance, staffing, service norms, and local consumer expectations.
China Business Industry Research Institute projected that the international hotpot restaurant market would reach USD 33.6 billion in 2022, with hotpot expected to grow faster than other Chinese restaurant formats internationally. Momo said brands still needed to improve product-market fit, adapt to very different market environments and customs, and understand local laws and regulations.
Note: IPO, revenue, acquisition, loss, export, and market-size figures are historical figures from the 2022 source article.