This is an English adaptation of a FoodBud historical article originally published on January 19, 2022.
FoodBud began publishing on August 24, 2021. By January 19, 2022, it had released more than 100 articles on restaurants and foodservice. The early pieces had little readership, and most were not traffic-oriented: they had few narrative hooks, limited entertainment value, and, because of time constraints, were often published without a second proofread.
Some traffic-driven pieces did perform, such as coverage of Element Fresh. But FoodBud’s view is that these articles rarely reveal major industry change; they are mostly useful as casual reading.
The publication has been advised that this style will not generate much traffic. That may be true, but the core purpose remains data collection and industry record-keeping: identifying what information is useful for understanding the foodservice sector.
FoodBud also opened an account on Xiaohongshu at the start of 2022, breaking down earlier WeChat articles into shorter posts as a test. In the prior seven days, the highest aggregate view count approached 600,000. FoodBud noted, however, that the traffic came from content categories that were not necessarily its real focus.
Still, the account will continue publishing there. FoodBud has seen interest from beverage supply-chain participants, different brands, consultants, and even secondary-market analysts sharing Xiaohongshu posts. One reader said the content helped with interview preparation.
FoodBud has focused heavily on listed companies, pre-IPO companies, and international foodservice operators because these businesses provide relatively reliable industry and operating data.
In China’s foodservice sector, people often refer to a RMB 4 trillion to RMB 5 trillion total market, or to subcategories worth hundreds of billions. From an operating perspective, FoodBud argues that these figures have limited practical meaning. Many restaurant subcategories are “ant markets”: the headline pool looks large, but the total market has little direct relevance to individual companies because chain concentration remains low.
FoodBud also observes that many founders are not objective enough about their product and business model. Based on conversations with dozens of restaurant-brand founders, the author sees a tendency to beautify the business and, when speaking with investors, casually cite valuations without a strong understanding of capital markets.
From another angle, many restaurant projects may not need equity financing, and may not be suitable for it. Franchise models can sometimes use social capital to recover funds and expand faster. But if the intent behind franchising is flawed, the model can fall into a cycle of extracting value from franchisees: a brand opens 100 or 200 stores, brand momentum declines, and the operator moves on to the next brand, with no certainty that the next one will succeed.
FoodBud’s future coverage will remain concentrated in three areas.
FoodBud will continue to analyze company-level operating data and strategic choices. When a company chooses business A over business B, that decision usually reflects internal trade-offs.
For outside observers, it is risky to judge those choices too casually. The better approach is to infer and reconstruct the logic behind them through operating experience, public information, and interviews where possible.
FoodBud cites its earlier analysis of Helens as an example. After reviewing the company’s business logic and operating philosophy, the author came away with respect for the business, especially its stated principle of “never calculating against customers.”
FoodBud will keep studying what changes and what does not in foodservice business models.
The author argues that the restaurant sector still has relatively little discussion of models, partly because talent density has historically been low, though this is gradually improving.
Examples that shaped FoodBud’s thinking include Krispy Kreme’s IPO filing, which discussed a hub-based model, and Yum China’s Pizza Hut store strategy, which reflected a similar logic. Some companies summarize these models explicitly; others use them without naming them.
FoodBud also points to Vita Coco’s supply-chain structure. Although revenue for such companies still depends heavily on retail channels such as supermarkets, Vita Coco’s back-end supply-chain partnerships are exclusive and deeply embedded. At a scale of 2.5 million coconuts consumed per day, that supply-chain participation creates a barrier around the business.
Juewei is another recurring case. FoodBud has covered it often because of its broad investment layout across the restaurant supply chain and its gradually formed, executable methodology. The impact of that strategy had not yet become obvious in financial statements, which made it difficult for many observers to understand.
FoodBud will also continue covering international markets.
Although the pandemic created some deglobalization pressure, parts of foreign trade remained active. FoodBud’s view is that as China’s national strength rises, cultural export will become part of that process, and Chinese brands going overseas will depend partly on broader national momentum.
The author notes that Coca-Cola and McDonald’s global expansion benefited from the strength of American culture. FoodBud expects Chinese companies may also benefit from China’s rise over time.
Among North American companies, FoodBud has found several interesting examples, including Dutch Bros, First Watch, Sovos Brands, and Sweetgreen. The author expected another wave of restaurant-sector listings in North America in 2022.
FoodBud also hopes more Chinese consumer brands can expand globally. Genki Forest had already started overseas expansion and was exporting to more than 40 countries. Mixue Bingcheng was expanding in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam and Indonesia, with more than 200 stores in Vietnam. Chagee, a regional brand from Southwest China, had also entered Malaysia.
Many tea-drink brands from Taiwan had been competing in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States for years, while their momentum in mainland China was declining. FoodBud argues that mainland Chinese brands with overseas capabilities have an opportunity to move into broader global markets; the question is timing.
FoodBud’s goal is to create incremental value from an operating-business perspective, rather than simply follow traffic trends and publish casual stories.
International-market coverage will later be grouped under “FB Insight.” Although few readers currently focus on international markets, FoodBud plans to keep tracking them because they can generate useful lessons.
Patience remains the operating principle: keep moving forward.
Note: IPO, valuation, financing, and 2022 market-expectation references are historical as of the original January 19, 2022 article.