This is an English adaptation of a FoodBud historical article originally published on September 7, 2022.
In early 2022, FoodBud published a first-stage review after one year of producing industry content. This September 2022 note is another checkpoint: what FoodBud has learned, why it exists, and where its coverage is focused.
At the start of 2022, FoodBud began splitting some WeChat content onto Xiaohongshu. The account was approaching its next milestone, with 10,000 followers within reach. Follower count is only one form of positive feedback, but the response was better than expected for highly specialized industry content on Xiaohongshu.
FoodBud sees Xiaohongshu as one of the more internationalized Chinese social platforms. Unlike Douyin, which is separated from TikTok overseas, Xiaohongshu is widely used by overseas Chinese users and Chinese-language readers, and contains a large volume of first-hand consumer experience and feedback.
Another important feature is authenticity. Many frontline store employees use Xiaohongshu, so comments about brands and products often feel unusually close to the operating reality. FoodBud points to comments on its own Xiaohongshu posts, and suggests looking at the state of Mixue Bingcheng’s employees, franchisees, and consumers there, especially for people who dismiss the brand as “low-end.” The same applies to Luckin Coffee.
When offline store networks become highly distributed, frontline sentiment from employees and consumers becomes extremely important. FoodBud says Xiaohongshu has been valuable for industry learning, even if it does not make money.
FoodBud began because its author wanted to read this kind of content but could not find reliable market data. Articles built around phrases such as “hundred-billion track” or “trillion-yuan market” were not useful. From an operator’s point of view, once a business is broken down by category and consumption occasion, many supposedly huge markets become much smaller.
The author also criticizes low-quality industry research. One example cited is a Shenzhen chain-training company that mixed up Paris Baguette and Holiland in a long article.
FoodBud’s core source materials are:
Another part of the work comes from the author’s own paid consumption experience. The author describes this as a deliberately biased consumer lens, echoing a comment from Lao Deng of Laihui Coffee: “You are a relatively picky consumer.” Before the pandemic, the author traveled frequently and also submitted App and offline service-improvement suggestions to service platforms such as Ctrip.
The name “FoodBud” came from several ideas. “Bud” suggests sprouting, so the project should pay attention to emerging and interesting things. It also sounds somewhat like “everybody,” reflecting interest in the people across the market and the many roles involved.
As the content evolved, FoodBud narrowed its focus mainly to restaurant chains and the backend supply chain. It now pays less attention to broader food and beverage companies because the field is too broad, difficult to fully understand, and time-consuming.
FoodBud summarizes its focus in three areas: globalization, capitalization, and chain development.
FoodBud wants to learn from strong foodservice chains in international markets while also watching four types of opportunities. It cites a disclosure from Tims China’s SPAC company as a useful summary:
At this stage, FoodBud’s core interest is how Chinese brands can go global. The author emphasizes that this will be a very long road.
FoodBud argues that China’s restaurant sector has many examples of non-compliant profits and exploitative franchise behavior, but over the long term that space will continue to shrink. Companies that pursue capital markets need compliance to endure; even those that do not pursue capital markets should still operate compliantly.
The author sees durable chain brands as businesses built slowly, often across generations. Capitalization can help family businesses with succession. Subway is cited as an international example with some negative-case characteristics.
Another angle is accessing cheaper capital across different markets to grow the business. This can happen through global capital markets, restaurant franchising, or licensing. FoodBud notes that restaurant franchising itself is a kind of social fundraising, but rejects the value system of exploiting franchisees. It points to hotel franchising, such as Marriott, as a comparison.
FoodBud evaluates chain development through three lenses:
The author says there is tension between whether supply chain or brand-building is more important, but leans toward supply chain, while acknowledging this may reflect a personal bias or limited understanding of branding.
Brand-building can be viewed as part of the store portfolio model: a company’s store mix and in-store product structure determine how it builds a brand. The reverse can also be true: the brand a company wants to become can determine how it builds its store portfolio and product structure.
Juewei Duck Neck is used as an example. FoodBud does not view the company as especially strong in brand-building, but sees it as very strong in supply chain. The author asks: who would say Juewei is not a strong brand in the marinated-snack category?
FoodBud notes that limited time has delayed organizing some conversations with friends in the industry, and readers have also pointed out frequent typos. The author accepts this, saying the goal is to meet an internal standard within limited time.
If globalization is the end state, FoodBud wants to look from a longer-term perspective: how can companies reach the end, or at least endure to the end?
The author welcomes discussion with people committed to building global brands, while noting that future updates may become less regular as the workload increases.
Note: Capital-market, SPAC, divestiture, acquisition, and forward-looking statements above are historical references from the September 7, 2022 source article.